[Seminaire CREM] Présentation de Peter Jost, Professeur émérite WHU – Otto Beisheim School of Management Faculté des Sciences Economiques Rennes

[Seminaire CREM] Présentation de Peter Jost, Professeur émérite WHU – Otto Beisheim School of Management Faculté des Sciences Economiques Rennes Jeudi 12 février, 12h15 Ille-et-Vilaine

Salle de Robien

Allocating Authority in Hierarchies under Moral Hazard and Limited Liability

**Abstract:**
We consider an organisational unit with one principal and two agents. The principal as head of the unit is confroned with a series of projects which require the input of both agents. Both agents are specialized in their productive activities. Since projects di§er with respect to their task-related issues the coordination of the agentsíactivities is essential. Should the principal be in charge of coordination (centralization) or one of the agents (decentralization)? We explain the existence of both organizational modes on the basis of incentive consideration. As an extension we explain under which circumstances it is optimal for the principal to delegate also contracting with the second agent (contract decentralization).

Dates et horaires de début et de fin (année – mois – jour et heure) :
Début : 2026-02-12T12:15:00.000+01:00
Fin : 2026-02-12T13:30:00.000+01:00

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 seminaire-sciences-eco@univ-rennes.fr

Faculté des Sciences Economiques 7 place Hoche 35000 Rennes Quartiers Centre Rennes 35064 Ille-et-Vilaine

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